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PACE LAW REVIEW 
Volume 13 Fall 1993 Number 2 
Thurgood Marshall: The Lawyer A s  Judge 
Bennett L . Gershman* 
Volume 389 of the United States Reports begins with the 
following terse note: 
The Honorable Thurgood Marshall, Solicitor General, was 
nominated by President Johnson on June 13,1967, to be an Asso- 
ciate Justice of this Court; the nomination was confirmed by the 
Senate on August 30, 1967; he was commissioned on the same 
date; he took the Constitutional Oath on September 1, 1967, and 
the Judicial Oath and his seat on October 2, 1967. 
So begins the tenure of one of our most revered Justices. 
When he took the Oath in 1967, it was the twilight of one of the 
Court's most brilliant periods: the Warren Court's revolution of 
criminal and racial justice. He was a part of that alliance for two 
Terms. When a new Court, and new alliances, moved the Court 
into the dark shadows, he and his closest colleague, William 
Brennan, Jr., held staunchly to their vision of the Court's his- 
toric function "to be watchful for the constitutional rights of the 
citizen, and against any stealthy encroachment thereon."' He re- 
mained faithful to that vision to the end when, as a lone figure 
. from those Halcyon days, he.would write in his last opinion, not 
merely for a Court that had marginalized him, but for all of 
those Americans who continued to revere him: "Power, not rea- 
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son, is the new currency of this Court's decision making."2 
Recalling that 1967 Term, his first Term, now a quarter of a 
century ago, I remember the ambivalence and the excitement I 
felt, as a young prosecutor, poring over those famous cases: 
Terry u. Ohio,3 Bruton u. United States,' Duncan u. Lou i~ iana ,~  
Witherspoon u. Illinois,+' Bumper u. North Carolina,' Gardner u. 
B r o d e r i ~ k , ~  Mancusi u. D e F ~ r t e , ~  Mathis u. United States.l0 
What an incredible Term for attorneys practicing criminal law. 
What an incredible Term for a new Justice joining forces with 
the great defenders of the Bill of Rights-Warren, Black, Doug- 
las, and Brennan. Those decisions-several easily denominated 
"landmarkw-- imposed new burdens on prosecutors and police, 
generated new standards to protect constitutional rights, and on 
the whole made the task of law enforcement far more complex. 
Although we' were prosecutors, most of us believed the cases 
were rightly decided. 
My classes study those cases today. To many of my stu- 
dents, the cases must seem like romantic dicta in an increasingly 
technical constitutional universe. We strive to give the cases a 
context; we try to communicate our expectations of their poten- 
tial for creating social justice. We also study two other decisions 
authored by Justice Marshall that first Term-Barber u. Page" 
and Powell u. Texas.12 Barber, an evidence case, involved the 
permissible use of former testimony as an exception to the hear- 
say rule. The case was not especially challenging, and as the 
most junior member of the Court, Justice Marshall wrote an un- 
controversial opinion for a unanimous Court denying to the 
prosecutor under the circumstances the use of highly probative 
evidence. Powell, on the other hand, was quite different and 
much more complicated, and controversial. Justice Marshall 
2. 111 S. Ct. 2597, 2619 (1991) (dissenting opinion). 
3. 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
4. 391 U.S. 123 (1968). 
5. 391 U.S. 145 (1968). 
6. 391 U.S. 510 (1968). 
7. 391 U.S. 543 (1968). 
8. 392 U.S. 273 (1968). 
9. 392 U.S. 364 (1968). 
10. 391 U.S. 352 (1968). 
11. 390 U.S. 719 (1968). 
12. 392 U.S. 514 (1968). 
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wrote a plurality opinion allowing the imposition of criminal 
punishment for public intoxication of a person who, as a chronic 
alcoholic, could not control his drinking. 
The 1990 Term, Justice Marshall's last on the Court, must 
have been a profoundly depressing experience for him. I focus 
particularly on those decisions that continued the trend of the 
Burger and Rehnquist Courts to limit the protection of individ- 
ual rights. The Court enlarged police authority to search,13 ar- 
rest,14 detain,16 and extract  confession^;^^ further restricted the 
writ of habeas corpus;17 made it easier for prosecutors to obtain 
the death penalty,18 and more difficult for capital defendants to 
challenge their  execution^.^^ Justice Marshall's health also was 
failing, perhaps the most important factor in his decision to re- 
tire. He died less than two years later. 
I believe that one of Justice Marshall's most enduring quali- 
ties was his ability to transcend appellate abstractions, to under- 
stand the grim reality of the adversary system, and to appreciate 
the imbalance of power that often puts criminal defense lawyers, 
particularly those lawyers appointed to represent indigents, a t  
such a disadvantage against the State. In contrast to so many 
appellate judges, notably some who have occupied seats on the 
Court, Justice Marshall had been a trial lawyer most of his pro- 
fessional life. When a claim was raised in a litigation context, he 
could understand the claim not as a sterile abstraction from a 
black and white record. When a prosecutor was accused of hav- 
ing suppressed exculpatory evidence, for example, Justice Mar- 
shall saw the claim not as a cold appellate point, but as an issue 
involving a tangible piece of proof which skilled defense counsel 
could have developed to her client's benefit, and which might 
have created the kind of doubt that would prevent the jury from 
returning a guilty verdict. 
Justice Marshall understood how to read and analyze a rec- 
ord, and how to evaluate proof, the kinds of skills that might not 
13. Florida v. Bostick, 111 S. Ct. 2382 (1991). 
14. California v. Hodari, 111 S. Ct. 1547 (1991). 
15. County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 111 S. Ct. 1661 (1991). 
16. Arizona v. Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. 1246 (1991). 
17. McKleskey v. Zant, 111 S. Ct. 1454 (1991). 
18. Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2598 (1991). 
19. Coleman v. Thompson, 111 S. Ct. 2546 (1991). 
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be sufficiently grasped by appellate judges who had never before 
tried a case. His dissenting opinions in Moore u. I l l i n ~ i s , ~ ~  
United States u. A g ~ r s , ~ '  and United States u. B ~ g l e y , ~ ~  are 
powerful examples of his careful review of the trial record, mark- 
edly different from the majority's superficial review, and how, 
from the perspective of an experienced trial lawyer, he was able 
to demonstrate convincingly how the withheld evidence was cru- 
cial to the jury's evaluation of the case. 
Justice Marshall also understood as a lawyer the premise 
that underlay the prosecutor's disclosure obligation: "It is the 
State that tries a man, and it is the State that must insure that 
the trial is fair."23 He also understood how that principle con- 
flicted with the "sporting event" model of criminal justice, in 
which the prosecutor, as a zealous advocate for a victimized pub- 
lic, aggressively seeks convictions. Given those contradictory 
roles, Justice Marshall understood that prosecutors, even those 
acting in complete good faith, might corrupt the truth-seeking 
process by overlooking or downgrading potentially favorable evi- 
dence. What state interest, Justice Marshall would ask, could 
justify withholding from a presumptively innocent defendant, 
whose liberty or even life is at  stake, information that is 
favorable to his defense?24 Justice Marshall wrote: "The prose- 
cutor's duty is quite straightforward: he must divulge all evi- 
dence that reasonably appears favorable to the defendant, erring 
on the side of d i sc l~sure . "~~ 
Justice Marshall warned that the Court's rule of criminal 
disclosure would undermine prosecutorial fairness. The Court's' 
standard for disclosure-that the withheld evidence must be 
sufficiently important, or ''materialW-legitimizes nondisclosure, 
he declared, by allowing prosecutors to withhold undeniably ex- 
culpatory evidence and then argue retrospectively that the evi- 
dence was not "material." 28 The standard also requires prosecu- 
tors to predict what impact various pieces of evidence will have 
20. 408 U.S. 786 (1972). 
21. 427 U.S. 97 (1976). 
22. 473 U.S. 667 (1985). 
23. Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. at 810 (1972) (dissenting opinion). 
24. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 699 (dissenting opinion). 
25. Id. 
26. Id. at 699-70. 
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on the Many prosecutors no doubt will err on the side of 
disclosure. Many others, however, will gamble that the evidence 
will turn out not to be material. 
Justice Marshall recognized that the greatest threat to relia- 
ble fact-finding emanates from the prosecutor's unique and deci- 
sive role in the adversary system, and his ability to control the 
adjudication process. A lengthy footnote is not necessary to sup- 
port the premise with which many persons, hardened by the re- 
alities of the criminal justice system, are acutely familiar: that 
the prosecutor's suppression of favorable evidence is pervasive, 
frequently willful, and probably accounts for as many miscar- 
riages of justice as any other single factor. 
The system of criminal guilt-finding, as we know it today, is 
a far cry from Justice Marshall's vision of a process that man- 
dates fair dealing by prosecutors. But his practical wisdom, 
gained as a lawyer who battled in the trenches of justice, will 
always be accessible to stimulate the conscience of those govern- 
ment officials who care to do the right thing. 
27. Id. at 701. 
Heinonline - -  13 Pace L. Rev. 303 1993-1994 
